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a b s t r a c t Researchers frequently rely on survey responses to determine whether
families receive government assistance and to study the effects of government programs, but these responses are often inaccurate. This study investigates misreporting in the child-care subsidy program by comparing survey responses on child-care
subsidy receipt with program administrative data in two states. While we ﬁnd a lower
rate of misreporting than is typical for other government assistance programs, overreporting of beneﬁt receipt is surprisingly common and generates overestimates of
program participation. Analyses further suggest that the frequency and systematic
nature of misreporting bias estimates of the predictors of program receipt and the
effects of the program. These ﬁndings illustrate the necessity of assessing the frequency of response errors and understanding their implications in generating valid
research results on the effects of government programs.

introduction
Surveys are a vital source of data for studying government assistance programs and assessing programs’ effects on participants’ outcomes.The quality
of survey data, especially the validity of responses about receipt of government assistance, therefore has important consequences for the quality and
accuracy of research on such programs. Underreporting of beneﬁt receipt is
a common problem in surveys of participation in programs targeted to lowincome families such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ðTANFÞ,
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ðSNAP, or food stampsÞ, the
Social Service Review (December 2015). © 2015 by The University of Chicago. All rights
reserved. 0037-7961/2015/8904-0004$10.00
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Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children
ðWICÞ, and Medicaid ðBollinger and David 1997; Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz 2001; Bitler, Currie, and Scholz 2003; Klerman, Ringel, and Roth
2005; Lynch et al. 2008; Meyer and Goerge 2011; Call et al. 2013Þ. While
underreporting of government assistance receives more attention in the
literature, overreporting, even when relatively infrequent, can lead to overestimates of the program participation rate ðMoore, Marquis, and Bogen
1996Þ. In addition, systematic measurement problems ðmeasurement error
related to covariatesÞ can substantially alter the estimates of program effectiveness and lead to erroneous policy conclusions. For example, a recent
study of the SNAP program argues that the ﬁnding in previous studies that
food stamps are associated with increased food insecurity is driven by
misreporting ðGundersen and Kreider 2008Þ.
Despite the increased importance of child-care subsidies as a work
support since the 1996 welfare program changes, much less is known about
misreporting of child-care subsidy receipt than about misreporting for other
major government programs. Two previous studies examine the accuracy
of reporting for the child-care subsidy program by comparing parent and
child-care provider reports of subsidy receipt, and they ﬁnd evidence that
survey responses are generally consistent with each other ðBowman et al.
2009; Johnson and Herbst 2013Þ. Although such comparisons are valuable,
the studies recognize that both parents and child-care providers may report
with error. To date, no study has linked and compared survey responses and
administrative data on child-care subsidies. Our key contribution is to link
survey respondents to administrative microdata in two states, Maryland and
Minnesota, allowing for a comparison of survey responses to program
beneﬁt receipt data. We illustrate the extent to which systematic response
errors may bias estimates of subsidy receipt and program effects by comparing models using administrative and survey data. We model both the
predictors of subsidy receipt and the predictors of employment including
subsidy receipt as a covariate.

b ac kg r o u n d
child-care subsidies
The current system of child-care subsidies for low-income families was
instituted in 1996 with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act ðPRWORAÞ, when several child-care programs were
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consolidated into one block grant, the Child Care and Development Fund
ðCCDFÞ. At the same time, funding for child-care subsidies, via CCDF, was
greatly increased. In the 2012 ﬁscal year, federal and state CCDF spending on child-care subsidies for low-income families totaled $11.4 billion
ðMatthews and Schmit 2014Þ. The CCDF allocation is comparable to TANF’s
$11.1 billion in state and federal expenditures for assistance ðAdministration
for Children and Families, US Department of Health and Human Services
2011Þ. Each month in federal ﬁscal year ðFFYÞ 2012 there were 1.5 million
children served by CCDF on average ðMatthews and Schmit 2014Þ. The
program has dual objectives of supporting families’ progress toward economic security and promoting child-care quality ð“Child Care and Development Fund ðCCDFÞ Program; Proposed Rule” 2013; US Senate Committee on Health Education Labor and Pensions 2015Þ. As a major support
program for low-income families, the CCDF program’s effects on family and
child outcomes are of great interest to researchers and policy makers.
Like most states, the two states in this study, Maryland and Minnesota,
distribute child-care subsidies through certiﬁcates or vouchers that eligible
families use to pay for child care. Obtaining a child-care subsidy begins with
an application to the subsidy program, usually through a county social services ofﬁce or, in some places, a child-care resource and referral agency.1
Once eligibility is determined, the applicant chooses a child-care provider.
The child-care provider bills the subsidy program for the authorized services. Once a subsidized arrangement has been selected, families may have
no further contact with the subsidy program until something changes ðe.g.,
the child-care arrangement or family incomeÞ or the applicant needs to recertify eligibility. The subsidy program’s direct payment from the government to child-care providers may affect recipients’ knowledge of their beneﬁts and familiarity with the program name. Beneﬁts such as SNAP or WIC,
on the other hand, use a beneﬁts card or coupon, which may remind recipients of the program’s name and their receipt of beneﬁts.
In Maryland, child-care subsidies are also called Purchase of Care ðPOCÞ
vouchers, and families with income below 50 percent of the state median
are eligible for the vouchers. In Minnesota, child-care subsidies are distrib1. While some states offer online applications ðAdams and Matthews 2013Þ, at the time of
the study, Minnesota and Maryland did not; paper applications and documentation were
required, which could be submitted in person or by mail.
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uted through the Child Care Assistance Program ðCCAPÞ. Families may be
eligible for the CCAP basic sliding fee program if the family’s income is
below 47 percent of the state median income or if they are part of the Minnesota Family Investment Program ðMFIP, Minnesota’s version of TANFÞ
or the Diversionary Work Program.
Given its importance as a support for low-income families, it is not surprising that there is a substantial body of research on child-care subsidies.
Studies examine the predictors of subsidy receipt ðMeyers and Heintze
1999; Tekin 2005, 2007; Durfee and Meyers 2006; Blau and Tekin 2007;
Herbst 2008; Johnson, Martin, and Brooks-Gunn 2011Þ, as well as the effects
of child-care subsidies on child and family outcomes. A particular focus of
the literature is the effect of subsidy on parental employment ðMeyers,
Heintze, and Wolf 2002; Blau and Tekin 2007; Tekin 2007; Ahn 2012Þ. There
are also studies of how subsidy receipt is related to child-care choices
ðTekin 2005; Weinraub et al. 2005; Ertas and Shields 2012Þ, child-care
quality ðRigby, Ryan, and Brooks-Gunn 2007; Ryan et al. 2011; Johnson,
Ryan, and Brooks-Gunn 2012Þ, child development and school readiness
ðHerbst and Tekin 2010; Forry, Davis, and Welti 2013; Johnson et al. 2013Þ,
and child and maternal well-being ðHerbst and Tekin 2011a, 2012, 2014;
Healy and Dunifon 2014Þ. While these studies use a variety of methods
and data sources, survey data are the most common data source for studies
of the child-care subsidy program.2 The validity of these data as an accurate
measure of beneﬁt receipt is therefore of importance to research and policy.
val i d i ty of s u r v ey re p o rt s o f g o v e r n m e n t b e n e ﬁts
There is a large body of literature demonstrating substantial response errors,
usually underreporting, in surveys about receipt of government beneﬁts, especially assistance targeted to low-income families. The estimated differences in monthly participation rates between administrative data and survey responses ðoften referred to as net underreportingÞ across 10 different

2. For instance, the Early Childhood Longitudinal Studies ðECLS-K and ECLS-BÞ, the
Survey of Income and Program Participation ðSIPPÞ, the National Survey of America’s Families ðNSAFÞ, and the National Household Education Survey have all been used in studies of
child-care subsidies. In addition, the National Survey of Early Care and Education ðNSECEÞ
was recently completed and included questions about child-care subsidy receipt.
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government transfer programs range from about 10 percent for Social
Security Old Age and Survivor’s Insurance ðOASIÞ to more than 50 percent
for Worker’s Compensation ðMeyer, Mok, and Sullivan 2009Þ.3 Instead of
measuring net misreporting, Kathleen Call and colleagues ð2013Þ quantify
misreporting by conditioning on receipt in administrative data, and they
ﬁnd that persons on Medicaid report beneﬁt receipt between 57 percent
and 89 percent of the time, depending on the study and the survey. Although
underreporting is the predominant problem, overreporting ðstating that one
receives a beneﬁt when one in fact does notÞ also occurs and may offset
underreporting in net reporting rates. Jeffrey Moore and colleagues ð1996Þ
ﬁnd that rates of overreporting for AFDC, Food Stamps, Unemployment Insurance, and Supplemental Security Income range from 1 percent to 4 percent using the Survey of Income and Program Participation ðSIPPÞ. Michael
Davern and colleagues ð2009Þ assess Medicaid reporting, and they ﬁnd that
overreporting partially offsets the rate of underreporting ð41 percentÞ to
generate a net underreporting rate around 31 percent. In sum, while underreporting is the more frequent problem, overreporting of beneﬁts should
also be considered as a threat to survey validity.
It is important to consider why people misreport. Survey response errors could occur due to either intentional or unintentional misreporting
by respondents. Memory or recall effects may lead to unintentional mistakes. The literature on the cognition of misreporting tends to show that the
greater the length of the recall period, the greater the error in responses
ðBound et al. 2001Þ. Difﬁculties correctly identifying a program can contribute to misreporting, especially overreporting. For instance, individuals may
confuse the beneﬁt they are asked about with other programs or other types
of assistance ðKlerman et al. 2005; Davern et al. 2009; Call et al. 2013Þ, a
problem referred to as beneﬁt confusion. Marietta Bowman, Rupa Datta,
and Ting Yan’s ð2010Þ report on cognitive testing for a question about childcare subsidy receipt ﬁnds that respondents’ understanding of the subsidy
question was generally in line with the intended meaning. However, respondents’ understanding of the word subsidy was somewhat variable, and

3. Five nationally representative surveys were used, including the Current Population
Survey ðCPSÞ, SIPP, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics ðPSIDÞ, the American Community
Survey ðACSÞ, and the Consumer Expenditure Interview Survey ðCE Survey ½Meyer et al.
2009Þ.

Measurement Error in Receipt of Child-Care Subsidies

| 691

questions referencing help from a welfare ofﬁce ða common way to ask
about subsidyÞ confused some respondents. The report suggests that using
the local program or ofﬁce name could substantially improve the accuracy
of reporting of child-care subsidy receipt. Respondents might also misreport
intentionally. Social desirability bias leads individuals to underreport undesirable behaviors and overreport desirable behaviors ðBound et al. 2001Þ.
Beneﬁt misreporting is often related to respondent characteristics ðsee, e.g.,
Bollinger and David ½1997 or Meyer and Goerge ½2011Þ.
All of these different sources of error could contribute to response biases
in reports of child-care subsidy receipt, but no study to date has validated
child-care subsidy reporting with administrative data. In describing their
samples, some studies compare survey rates of subsidy take-up to population participation rates based on administrative data ðBlau and Tekin 2007;
Herbst and Tekin 2011bÞ. Similar rates could, however, hide offsetting misreporting on the micro level.
Two studies compare child-care subsidy receipt using parent and childcare provider survey data. Marietta Bowman and colleagues ð2009Þ compare subsidy receipt responses for 43 parents to that of their child-care
providers. They ﬁnd a 75 percent agreement rate and that underreporting
by parents was the predominant form of disagreement. Anna Johnson and
Chris Herbst ð2013Þ ﬁnd an overall agreement rate of 78 percent between
parents and providers. They also identify a number of possible subsidyspeciﬁc measurement issues, including the fact that parents may not know
exactly which funding stream is paying for care, whether a copayment is the
full cost, or if the provider is paid directly by the subsidy program.
Johnson and Herbst ð2013Þ also compare models predicting subsidy
receipt using both parental and provider reports, and they ﬁnd few systematic differences between the models. They model whether disagreement between parents and providers on subsidy receipt is related to respondent
or child characteristics, and they ﬁnd disagreement to be relatively random.
However, Johnson and Herbst acknowledge that providers as well as parents may misreport due to recall error, uncertainty about which families or
which children within a family receive subsidies, or confusion with regard
to different funding streams. Providers may also be reluctant to share information about their ﬁnances, including subsidy income. Johnson and
Herbst ð2013Þ indicate that an important future direction for research is to
compare parent survey data and administrative data, as well as to quantify
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how errors in subsidy reports from survey data generate erroneous estimates of the effect of subsidy on other outcomes.

mea suring mi sreporting
One approach to measuring misreporting is to estimate the proportion of
cases for which two data sources disagree ðe.g., Johnson and Herbst 2013Þ.
However, the probability of disagreement is affected by the population rate
of participation as well as the rates of underreporting and overreporting
ðBound et al. 2001Þ. An alternative approach is to measure the net underreporting ðor overreportingÞ rate as the difference between the proportion
of the sample reporting beneﬁt receipt in survey data and in the administrative data. Such net rates can disguise substantial offsetting misreporting
on the individual level.
A third approach, and the one we employ, is to assess the conditional
probabilities of accurate reporting assuming that administrative data are
the authoritative source of information.4 We denote the administrative value
of subsidy as y*, which takes on the values of zero ðno subsidyÞ or one
ðsubsidy receiptÞ, and we denote the survey value of subsidy receipt as y.
We examine whether someone receiving a subsidy in the administrative
data reported not receiving a subsidy in the survey ðunderreporting, p01 ;
Prðy 5 0 j y * 5 1ÞÞ, or alternatively whether someone not receiving a subsidy in the administrative data reported that they were receiving a subsidy
in the survey ðoverreporting, p10 ; Prð y 5 1 j y* 5 0ÞÞ.5 This approach allows us to distinguish between overreporting and underreporting, not just
disagreement, on the micro level.

4. Treating the administrative data as true is common in research on misreporting ðKlerman et al. 2005; Meyer et al. 2009; Meyer and Goerge 2011Þ. As we discuss below, it is possible that there are some errors in the administrative data. But individuals have to provide
identiﬁcation to receive child-care subsidies, and the data are based on payments from states’
subsidy programs, so they are relatively reliable. We discuss implications of administrative
data errors in the limitations section.
5. The terminology of overreporting and underreporting is not standardized in the literature. Errors of commission and omission are also common terms equivalent to overreporting and underreporting. Additionally, the terms false positive and false negative are
also often used for the same concepts we term overreporting and underreporting. However,
below we use false positive and false negative in a different sense, conditioned on survey
response, a use akin to their use in the medical literature.
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i m p l i c at i o n s o f m i s r e p o rt i ng f o r s u r v ey e s t i m at e s
The probabilities of accurate reporting in the survey depend on the probability of program receipt at the population level, denoted p, as well as the
rates of overreporting and underreporting ðAigner 1973; Baker, Stabile, and
Deri 2004Þ. The conditional probability that the administrative data is yes
given that the survey response is no ða false negativeÞ is given by
Prðy* 5 1 j y 5 0Þ 5

p01 p
:
p01 p 1 p00 ð1 2 pÞ

ð1Þ

The conditional probability that the administrative data is no given that the
survey response is yes ða false positiveÞ is
Prðy* 5 0 j y 5 1Þ 5

p10 ð1 2 pÞ
:
p10 ð1 2 pÞ 1 p11 p

ð2Þ

In cases where less than half the population receives a program beneﬁt
ðp < .5Þ, false negatives are less likely than false positives even if p01 5 p10
ðequal underreporting and overreportingÞ; that is, Pr ð y* 5 1j y 5 0Þ <
Prðy* 5 0jy 5 1Þ.

t h e p r o b l e m of sys t e m at i c pat t e r n s i n m i s r e p o rt i ng
When using survey data on program receipt to estimate multivariate models, misreporting is particularly problematic if it is correlated with other
variables in the model. Then all the estimated coefﬁcients will be biased,
with the size and direction of bias a function of the correlation between the
measurement error and the other variables ðBound et al. 2001Þ. We therefore test whether differences in reported subsidy receipt across the data
sources are related to any respondent characteristics, modeling underreporting and overreporting separately, as relationships between different
types of misreporting and covariates are likely to vary.

c o n s e q u e nce s w h e n t he d e p e n d e n t va r i ab l e
is mismeasured
What are the consequences for empirical models in which mismeasured
program receipt is the dependent variable, for instance, when the predictors of subsidy receipt are being estimated? In contrast to the case with
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continuous variable models, because program receipt is a binary variable,
biased coefﬁcient estimates will result even if the measurement error in
subsidy receipt ðthe dependent variableÞ is independent of covariates ðHausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton 1998; Bound et al. 2001Þ. Because subsidy
receipt is always zero or one, there is a negative correlation between the
error and the true value ðBound et al. 2001Þ.6 This correlation means that
measurement error in a binary covariate is not classical measurement error.
If subsidy receipt is measured with random error, the coefﬁcient estimates
for predictors of subsidy receipt will be biased as a function of overreporting and underreporting ðBound et al. 2001Þ:7
yPrð y 5 1 j xÞ
yPrð y* 5 1 j x* Þ
:
5 ½1 2 ðp01 1 p10 Þ
yx
yx*

ð3Þ

However, if misreporting is systematically related to the covariates, the estimated coefﬁcients in a model with subsidy receipt as the dependent variable can be biased in either direction.

c o n s e q u e nc e s w h e n su b s i dy re c e i p t i s a co va r i at e
In numerous studies estimating the effects of child-care subsidies on child
and family outcomes, subsidy receipt is used as an independent variable ða
covariateÞ.8 In the case where the mismeasured subsidy variable, now denoted x since it is a covariate, is the only covariate, then the estimated coefﬁcient, b, is a function of the true coefﬁcient b* and the rates of false
positives and false negatives ðAigner 1973; Bound et al. 2001Þ:
b 5 b* ½1 2 ðPr ðx* 5 1 j x 5 0Þ 1 Prðx* 5 0 j x 5 1ÞÞ:

ð4Þ

If, for instance, both underreporting and overreporting are 25 percent ða
plausible estimate from the literatureÞ, and if true subsidy receipt increases

6. If y* 5 1, then y 2 y* ≤ 0, and likewise if y* 5 0, then y 2 y* ≥ 0.
7. Although instrumental variable techniques can be used to correct for random measurement error when a continuous variable is mismeasured, instrumental variable techniques cannot be used in this case because measurement errors in binary variables are
mean-reverting and correlated with the true value ðBound et al. 2001Þ.
8. Studies examining the effect of subsidy receipt on various outcomes frequently use
survey data ðMeyers et al. 2002; Tekin 2005, 2007; Weinraub et al. 2005; Blau and Tekin
2007; Rigby et al. 2007; Herbst and Tekin 2010, 2011a, 2012, 2014; Ryan et al. 2011; Ahn 2012;
Ertas and Shields 2012; Johnson et al. 2012; Forry et al. 2013; Johnson et al. 2013Þ.
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the probability of employment by 25 percentage points, the estimated effect
would be only a 12.5 percentage point increase ðusing the numbers in this
exampleÞ. Biases become even more problematic and complex when misreporting is systematic and more covariates are included in the model.

d ata
s u r v ey d ata
The survey data used in this study are from two similar surveys of families
in Maryland and Minnesota, the Minnesota Child Care Choices Study ðTout
et al. 2011Þ and the Maryland Child Care Choices Study ðGoldhagen et al.
2013Þ. The surveys sampled families with low incomes who had one or
more children age 6 or younger. Potential survey respondents were identiﬁed when they applied to receive assistance ðsuch as welfare or child-care
subsidiesÞ through their county’s social services ofﬁce and lived in one of
the participating counties. The surveys were designed to target families who
would be likely to be eligible for child-care subsidies.9 In Minnesota, once
potential survey respondents were identiﬁed at the county social services
ofﬁce, they were given packets of information on the study and asked if they
wanted to participate. Initially, 437 families consented to participate in the
survey.10 Those who consented were subsequently contacted to complete
the survey. Of the 437 families who consented, 323 ð74 percentÞ completed
the baseline interview.11 In Maryland, there were 512 families who were
initially recruited, and 289 ð56 percentÞ ultimately completed the baseline
interview.12

9. This sampling strategy generated a sample of subsidy recipients that receives welfare
at somewhat higher rates than subsidy recipients overall. Comparisons between the reported
characteristics of our sample ðapp. table A1Þ and those entering the subsidy system in the
two states demonstrates that while slightly less than half of all subsidy entrants ð47 percent
in Minnesota, 43 percent in Maryland ½Davis, Krafft, and Tout 2014; Davis et al. 2015Þ received welfare beneﬁts, around two-thirds ð68 percent in Minnesota, 67 percent in MarylandÞ of our sample of subsidy recipients did so. These differences should be kept in mind
when considering the generalizability of our ﬁndings.
10. Consent could occur either at the time in the ofﬁce or by calling the study phone
number later.
11. The reduction in sample from 437 to 323 in Minnesota is because 16 were not ultimately eligible, 24 refused to participate, and 74 could not be reached by telephone.
12. Among the 512 families recruited, ultimately 33 were not eligible, 10 refused, and 15
turned in consent forms too late ðafter the recruitment window closedÞ.
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The purpose of the surveys was to examine child-care decision making
for low-income families, with a particular focus on the resources and supports that can help families access different care options.The same sampling
strategies and survey ﬁrm were used in Minnesota and Maryland, and the
questionnaires had many identical items. The surveys were conducted by
telephone, and they collected data on families’ characteristics, child-care
use, and how families paid for child care—including whether they received
assistance through subsidies. Questions were asked speciﬁcally in reference
to the “focal child,” a child age 6 or younger at the time of the survey. The
survey respondent was the person with the most knowledge of the focal
child’s care arrangements, usually the mother.13 The surveys were longitudinal, but we use only the baseline surveys for both Minnesota and Maryland
to preclude any issues of nonrandom attrition. The Minnesota baseline survey was conducted between August 2009 and July 2010. The Maryland baseline survey was conducted from July 2011 to October 2012. Further details
on the surveys can be found in Tout et al. ð2011Þ and Goldhagen et al. ð2013Þ.
The key variable of interest in the surveys is respondents’ report of childcare subsidy receipt for the focal child. The question about subsidy in both
the Maryland and Minnesota survey was the same:14 “I am going to read a
list of sources that might help you pay for ½focal child’s child care. Please
say yes or no to indicate whether you currently get help from this source.”
For Maryland, one of the response options was “Child-care subsidy program/Purchase of Care ðPOCÞ vouchers.” In Minnesota, the equivalent
response was “The County Child Care Assistance Program or CCAP.” We
consider a yes response to these questions to indicate child-care subsidy
receipt. It is noteworthy that the survey questions explicitly used the name
of the relevant program in the state in the response options, which is likely
to improve the accuracy of responses ðCall, Davern, and Blewett 2007;
Bowman et al. 2010Þ. Most other surveys, in contrast, ask about receiving
help paying for child care from a government agency, welfare ofﬁce, or social service agency ðJohnson and Herbst 2013Þ.15 While our survey had an
13. Fewer than 10 percent of respondents are male.
14. Although the question was the same, the universe was slightly different: in Minnesota
even parents whose current arrangement was parental care only were asked about subsidy
receipt, while parents in Maryland were not ðand are assumed to not receive subsidyÞ.
15. Some national surveys asking about beneﬁt receipt, such as the Current Population
Survey, use state-speciﬁc names for programs such as Medicaid ðCall et al. 2007Þ. However,
this practice is not common in the surveys that are used to assess child-care subsidy receipt
and related outcomes ðJohnson and Herbst 2013Þ.
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additional response option of “welfare agency or social services ofﬁce” for
assistance paying for child care, as we discuss later, including additional
responses based on this question does not reduce measurement error.

a d m i n i s t r at i v e d ata
Each state provided data on child-care subsidy program participants from
the program’s information management system through a data-sharing
agreement. The Maryland State Department of Education provided administrative data on all children utilizing child-care subsidies between June
2007 and September 2012. The data indicate the weekðsÞ in this time period
during which the child received child care paid for ðin part or fullÞ by a
subsidy. For the Minnesota sample, the Minnesota Department of Human
Services provided monthly administrative data for children participating in
the child-care subsidy program between January 2009 and June 2010.
An important issue that complicates quantifying misreporting is that
different time frames, deﬁnitions, or universes may be applied across surveys and administrative data. Accurately matching responses across administrative and survey data is also critical to accurately quantifying misreporting. Jacob Klerman and colleagues ð2005Þ describe the process of matching
samples for validation and potential issues with the sampling frame that
might create a false measure of misreporting. Interviewer and data entry
error across both sources of data could also generate misreports, as could
data mismatches.
In both states, information was provided to link records from the survey
to the administrative data; however, the matching process was slightly
different in the two states. In Minnesota, survey respondents’ households
were matched to households in the administrative database based primarily
on respondents’ name, gender, and date of birth. Additional variables were
consulted if needed ðincluding address and child’s date of birth and genderÞ.
Respondents were identiﬁed on a case-by-case basis and not through statistical matching. Because Minnesota survey respondents were recruited at
the time of application for government assistance, nearly all of them were
found in the administrative database. The survey respondents were in the
state database because of their application and/or receipt of public beneﬁts
such as TANF, Medicaid, or SNAP, not necessarily for child-care assistance.
Based on these look-ups, a matching household record in the administrative
data was present for 98 percent of the survey respondents. After household
matching, the focal child was identiﬁed among household members by
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matching on birth month and year. Because of the nature of the matching
process, all matches of the survey data to the administrative data were
unique.
In Maryland, the matching of families was based on the respondent’s
name and date of birth. The focal child was then identiﬁed based on the
child’s name and date of birth. As in Minnesota, respondents were identiﬁed
on a case-by-case basis and not through statistical matching. Only complete
matches for respondents were used, but partial matches of children’s information were allowed. Of the survey respondents, 53 percent were located
in the child-care subsidy administrative data, and 4 percent of the matches
were partial matches for children. This rate is much lower than for Minnesota, where everyone in that sample received an identiﬁcation number used
across multiple programs. In Maryland, however, identiﬁcation occurred
only through the child-care subsidy program and therefore only among
those who ever received a subsidy in Maryland. After locating individuals
in Maryland’s records, we identiﬁed a single best match in the linking data,
making survey to administrative data mapping unique. Unlike in Minnesota,
in Maryland we have no information from other state programs, so we cannot determine whether the lack of a match is due to lack of participation
in the subsidy program or due to a failure of matching. Failure to match is
particularly concerning when someone reports subsidy receipt in the survey but no record can be found in the administrative data.
Problems in matching and issues in the administrative data itself have
different implications for the results, depending on the nature and severity
of data problems. There could be inaccuracies in the administrative data.
Although identifying documentation is required in order to obtain a subsidy,
data entry errors may still occur, or different identifying information could
be provided with the survey, such as an alternative name, than in the administrative data. Errors could also occur in billing that lead to an inaccurate measure of subsidy receipt when the correct individual is identiﬁed.
Individuals with common names or common addresses may be more difﬁcult to correctly identify, particularly if there are slight discrepancies in one
of the data sources. Families who move more frequently or have greater
variation in family composition may also be more difﬁcult to identify. Although it is possible that we have some matching failures in Maryland, given
the systematic patterns we ﬁnd in misreporting and the nearly universal
matching of Minnesota survey respondents, failures in record matching are
unlikely to be driving our results. Likewise, inaccuracies in the adminis-
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trative data that occur despite correct matching would have to occur at a
very high rate in order to completely account for our results, which seems
unlikely for data related to subsidy payments.
Another key issue to address in linking the survey responses to administrative records is matching the timing of the survey to the administrative
data. The survey asks about current use of child-care subsidies. To allow
for slight differences in timing, we use the calendar month of the survey
interview date to match survey and administrative dates, and we undertake
sensitivity analysis with alternative time windows. We identify use of subsidy in the administrative data based on whether the child received subsidized child care within the speciﬁed time period. The subsidy payment
systems in each state provide information on when subsidized child-care
services were received. Payment for these services may have occurred in
subsequent months, but the data we use to identify subsidy receipt captures
the month when the services took place.Thus, only individuals with a matching record in the administrative database and receiving subsidy in the calendar month of their survey interview are identiﬁed as receiving a subsidy ða
binary variableÞ in the administrative data.
The original survey samples were 289 individuals in Maryland and 323
in Minnesota. Observations are excluded if the respondent did not consent
to administrative data access or if there is not adequate overlap between
the administrative data and the survey completion date, as some surveys
were completed outside the time frame covered by the administrative data.
For instance, individuals surveyed in October 2012 in Maryland are excluded from the sample since the administrative data only covered through
September 2012. The resulting sample includes 267 individuals in Maryland
and 319 in Minnesota.

t h e e x t e n t o f m i s r e p o rt i n g o f c h i l d - c a r e
s u b s i dy re c e i p t
r at e s o f o v e r r e p o rt i ng a n d u n d e r r e p o rt i ng
Table 1 presents the key results on the frequency of misreporting by showing the survey responses about subsidy receipt, conditioned on subsidy
status from the administrative data. In Maryland, 17.9 percent of those not
receiving a subsidy in the administrative data reported that they were receiving a subsidy in the survey ði.e., a 17.9 percent rate of overreportingÞ.
Additionally, 14.5 percent of those receiving a subsidy in the administra-
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table 1.

Overreporting and Underreporting of Subsidy Receipt, Percentage by State
Administrative Data: Subsidy Receipt
Maryland

Minnesota

Survey: Subsidy Receipt

No

Yes

Total

No

Yes

Total

No
Yes

82.1
17.9

14.5
85.5

61.0
39.0

78.4
21.6

19.2
80.8

56.1
43.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Total

Sources.—Authors’ calculations based on Maryland and Minnesota parent surveys and Maryland and
Minnesota administrative data.
Note.—Overreporting occurs when a respondent who is not receiving subsidy based on the administrative data reports receiving subsidy in the survey. Underreporting occurs when a respondent who does
receive subsidy based on the administrative data reports not receiving subsidy in the survey. The sample
size was 267 in Maryland and 319 in Minnesota.

tive data reported that they were not receiving a subsidy in the survey
ð14.5 percent underreportingÞ. Looking at Minnesota, there are near equal
probabilities of overreporting ð21.6 percentÞ and underreporting ð19.2 percentÞ, rates that are slightly higher than Maryland’s.While the data indicate
that misreporting occurred, a large majority of survey respondents reported
subsidy receipt accurately. Notably, however, both underreporting and overreporting occurred. This pattern suggests that people are not systematically
unwilling to report the support they receive but instead did not know what
this type of support is called ðbeneﬁt confusionÞ or misunderstood the survey question.
Because the survey asked about current use of child-care subsidies, but
the administrative data was on a weekly or monthly basis, one issue that may
affect the calculated rates of misreporting is the time window used to match
the two data sources. We checked a variety of different administrative time
windows for comparison with the 1-month deﬁnition ðsee table A2 in the
appendixÞ. The availability of weekly administrative data in Maryland allowed us to test a deﬁnition based on the week of the interview plus or
minus 1 week ð“3 weeks” deﬁnitionÞ. For both states, we lengthened the time
window to examine the administrative data on subsidy receipt based on a
3-month window around the interview date, and we also checked whether
the child was receiving a subsidy at any time covered by the administrative
data.16 Table A2 compares the percentages of respondents who overreported
and underreported using these alternative deﬁnitions of the time window.
The results indicate that alternative time windows do not lead to substantial
improvements in response alignment. It is also notable that extending the
16. The administrative data covers 18 months in Minnesota and 63 months in Maryland.
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deﬁnition of subsidy to include individuals who were observed as receiving
a subsidy at any time does not decrease overreporting substantially.
The survey questions also allow us to test an alternative, broader deﬁnition of child-care subsidy receipt. We consider broad subsidy receipt to include anyone who reported they received help paying for child care through
a welfare agency or social services ofﬁce ðin addition to those who said yes
to POC voucher or CCAPÞ or gave a response such as “through the county”
in the open-ended “other” responses.Table A3, in the appendix, presents the
percentage of individuals receiving a subsidy in the administrative data
using the broader deﬁnition of subsidy receipt. The broader deﬁnition leads
to some decreases in underreporting, but these are accompanied by larger
increases in overreporting. Using a broader deﬁnition of subsidy seems to
generate more measurement error in survey responses of subsidy receipt in
this sample.

r at e s o f fa l s e p o s i t i v e s a n d fa l s e n e g at i v e s
The misreporting rates observed in both Maryland and Minnesota have implications for studies of the child-care subsidy program using survey data
because of the low program participation rate. Table 2 uses the same data
as table 1, but instead of column percentages ðthat measure overreporting
and underreportingÞ, row percentages are used to calculate the rates of false
positives and false negatives. In other words, while table 1 conditions on status in the administrative data, table 2 conditions on survey status. Overall,
around a third ð31.1 percent in Maryland and 37.6 percent in MinnesotaÞ of
individuals were receiving a subsidy at the time of the survey, based on the

table 2.

False Positive and False Negative Reports of Subsidy Receipt, Percentage by State
Administrative Data: Subsidy Receipt
Maryland

Minnesota

Survey: Subsidy Receipt

No

Yes

Total

No

Yes

Total

No
Yes
Total

92.6
31.7
68.9

7.4
68.3
31.1

100.0
100.0
100.0

87.2
30.7
62.4

12.9
69.3
37.6

100.0
100.0
100.0

Sources.—Authors’ calculations based on Maryland and Minnesota parent surveys and Maryland and
Minnesota administrative data.
Note.—The percentage of the sample that is false positives is deﬁned as the percentage of those who
say they received subsidy in the survey who were not found to be receiving subsidy based on the
administrative data. The percentage of false negatives is the percentage of those who report not receiving
subsidy in the survey who were found to be on subsidy in the administrative data. The sample size was 267
for Maryland and 319 for Minnesota.

702 |

Social Service Review

administrative data. When conditioned on their status in the administrative
data, as table 1 demonstrated, individuals are approximately equally likely to
overreport or underreport, but the results are quite different in terms of the
false positives and false negatives in table 2. Among those responding that
they were not receiving a subsidy in the survey in Maryland, only 7.4 percent had received a subsidy according to the administrative data, a low rate
of false negatives. Similarly in Minnesota, the rate of false negatives is
12.9 percent. The rate of false positives is much higher; 31.7 percent of those
in Maryland who stated in the survey that they received a subsidy were
not recorded in the administrative data as having actually received a subsidy.
Similarly, 30.7 percent of those who stated that they received a subsidy in
the Minnesota survey data are false positives. Conditioning on survey reports, false positives are a far more common problem than false negatives,
and this will attenuate estimates of program effectiveness if survey data are
used to estimate program effects.
As a result of misreporting, estimates of subsidy receipt based on the
survey responses overestimate the rate of subsidy participation compared to
the administrative data. The survey estimate of participation is p10 ð1 2 pÞ 1
p11 p, and therefore in cases in which there is less than 50 percent participation in the program, overreporting will inﬂuence the survey estimate of
participation more than underreporting. In Maryland, the survey estimate
of subsidy receipt is 39.0 percent, a rate about 8 percentage points higher
than the administrative data. Likewise in Minnesota, while 37.6 percent of
respondents received subsidy in the administrative data, 43.9 percent of
respondents reported subsidy receipt in the survey.

sys t e m at i c m i s r e p o rt i ng
This section presents models to identify possible systematic patterns in
overreporting and underreporting of child-care subsidy program participation in the two states. We hypothesize that different factors may contribute
to overreporting versus underreporting, and so we estimate separate models
rather than a model of disagreement that combines overreporting and underreporting. For instance, having several children, only one of whom is receiving a subsidy, likely increases overreporting ði.e., reporting subsidy
because the family receives it or because of uncertainty as to which child
receives itÞ, but it decreases underreporting because a family with several
children might be more likely to know the name of the program. Therefore,
we estimate separate probit models for the probability of underreporting
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or overreporting, including a number of covariates to test which, if any, are
related to misreporting. The dependent variables are the conditional probabilities, p01 ðnÞ 5 Pr ðy 5 0jy* 5 1Þ and p10 ðnÞ 5 Prðy 5 1jy* 5 0Þ of underreporting and overreporting, respectively. These probabilities are conditioned
on the administrative value of subsidy receipt. These are the probabilities
that determine the degree of bias when beneﬁt receipt is used in a regression ðBound et al. 2001Þ, and they are the dependent variables commonly
used in other studies that test for systematic beneﬁt misreporting ðe.g.,
Bollinger and David ½1997 and Meyer and Goerge ½2011Þ.
We use a number of family and child characteristics from the surveys to
examine whether there are systematic patterns in misreporting.17 The covariates in the binary models for overreporting and underreporting are the
same, selected based on possible connections with drivers of misreporting
generally as well as those which past studies examine ðJohnson and Herbst
2013Þ; factors that affect one type of misreporting but not the other will be
insigniﬁcant when they do not matter. The covariates include the respondent’s education level, which may be related to the respondent’s knowledge
about the program. Individuals are categorized as having less than a high
school education, ðexactlyÞ a high school education, some college ðbut less
than a BAÞ, or a BA or higher. We also include the respondent’s employment status, comparing those with no job to those with a part-time ðless
than 30 hoursÞ or full-time ð30 hours or moreÞ job. Individuals’ employment
status is a precondition for certain types of subsidy eligibility, and individuals may misreport subsidy receipt in relation to their employment. Household structure may also affect reporting. Single parents are more likely to
be informed about subsidy than respondents from two-parent households,
where the other parent may be responsible for child-care payment, subsidy
eligibility, or enrollment. We therefore include a dummy variable for being
in a single-parent, as compared to two-parent, household. Receipt of TANF
might affect respondents’ use of subsidy and familiarity with the program,
so we include a dummy variable for household receipt of welfare. A child’s
age might inﬂuence respondents’ familiarity with the program and its name,
so we include a categorical variable for child age, comparing infants ðless
than 16 monthsÞ to toddlers ð16–32 monthsÞ and preschool/school-aged children ð331 monthsÞ. Cross-cultural communication may be also be a factor
in reporting, so we include respondent’s race as a covariate, categorized as
17. Characteristics from the administrative data are not used, since these are only available for those receiving a subsidy in the administrative data.
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ð1Þ white, non-Hispanic, ð2Þ Hispanic, or ð3Þ nonwhite, non-Hispanic. Additionally, the number of children for whom the respondent is the primary
caregiver is included in the model. Parents with more children may be less
well informed about how they are paying for different children’s care than
parents with fewer children, or they may report subsidy based on receipt of
subsidy for other children.The descriptive statistics for these characteristics
are presented in the appendix in table A1.

t e s t i ng f o r sys t e m at i c pat t e r n s i n u n d e r r e p o rt i ng
a n d o v e r r e p o rt i ng
The marginal effects for probit models of underreporting and overreporting,
shown in table 3 and discussed below, demonstrate that a number of respondent characteristics are signiﬁcantly related to subsidy misreporting.We estimated separate models for Minnesota and Maryland, but ﬁnding that the
models are similar, we present a pooled model for both states in the text ðseparate models for the two states are provided in the appendix in table A4Þ.
The pooled model beneﬁts from a larger sample size and suggests the types
of misreporting that might be found in survey data that include multiple
states.
Systematic Patterns in Underreporting
The pooled model shows a number of statistically signiﬁcant predictors of
underreporting.Those with full-time jobs are less likely to underreport, compared to those without jobs. Hispanic respondents and non-Hispanic nonwhites are signiﬁcantly more likely to underreport than white, non-Hispanic
respondents. Being a single parent or on welfare is negatively associated with
underreporting. Parents are less likely to underreport if they had a preschool
or school age child compared to those with infants. Notably, only two variables are not statistically signiﬁcantly associated with underreporting: respondent education and the number of children in the household. Additionally, the relationships between covariates and underreporting are sizable.
For instance, the marginal effect of TANF receipt in the pooled model is a
decrease of 15.1 percentage points in the probability of underreporting.
Systematic Patterns in Overreporting
When it comes to overreporting, part-time and full-time workers are significantly less likely to overreport than respondents who were not working.
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Marginal Effects for Probit Models of Underreporting and Overreporting
Dependent Variable

Respondent’s education
ðless than high school omittedÞ:
High school
Some college
BA1
Respondent’s employment
ðno job omittedÞ:
Part-time ð< 30 hours/weekÞ
Full-time ð301 hours/weekÞ
Respondent’s race
ðwhite, non-Hispanic omittedÞ:
Hispanic
Nonwhite, non-Hispanic
Single parent
Welfare
Child’s age ðinfant omittedÞ:
Toddler
Preschool or school age
Number of children
N ðobservationsÞ
Probability of model
Pseudo R 2

Subsidy Received:
Pr(Underreporting)

No Subsidy:
Pr(Overreporting)

2.018
ð.073Þ
2.064
ð.070Þ
.041
ð.136Þ

.005
ð.051Þ
2.059
ð.049Þ
.135
ð.116Þ

2.008
ð.074Þ
2.221***
ð.046Þ

2.0931
ð.055Þ
2.114*
ð.050Þ

.309*
ð.149Þ
.113*
ð.047Þ
2.203**
ð.075Þ
2.151*
ð.065Þ

.189*
ð.089Þ
.142***
ð.039Þ
.047
ð.044Þ
.062
ð.043Þ

2.116
ð.071Þ
2.1221
ð.069Þ
.004
ð.026Þ
202
.000
.225

.011
ð.052Þ
.041
ð.048Þ
.0301
ð.017Þ
382
.000
.097

Sources.—Authors’ calculations based on Maryland and Minnesota parent surveys and
Maryland and Minnesota administrative data.
Note.—Marginal effects are calculated at observed values for all characteristics. Standard errors are in parentheses.
1
p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.

Overreporting is also more likely among Hispanic respondents and nonwhite, non-Hispanic respondents than non-Hispanic whites. Each additional child increases the probability of overreporting. We suspect this is
because parents may be uncertain or misreport if they receive a subsidy
for another child but not the focal child. As is the case for underreporting,
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the marginal effects are sizable. For instance, the marginal effect for being
Hispanic as compared to white, non-Hispanic is an increase of 18.9 percentage points in the probability of overreporting. Clearly, there are systematic
patterns of overreporting beneﬁt receipt in the survey data.18

t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f m i s r e p ort i n g
Having established that misreporting in survey reports of subsidy receipt
is related to family and child characteristics, this section demonstrates the
potential consequences of misreporting for drawing valid conclusions about
the predictors and consequences of subsidy receipt. Misreporting can potentially generate erroneous estimates of program participation and program effects. Below, the case of beneﬁt receipt as a dependent variable is
examined ﬁrst, followed by an example in which beneﬁt receipt is a covariate.

c o m pa r i s o n o f r e s u lts wh e n s u b s i dy r e c e i p t
i s t h e d e p e n d e n t va r i a b l e
While systematic relationships between covariates and misreporting theoretically result in biased estimates of the relationships between covariates
and subsidy receipt measured using survey data, an important question is
the degree of bias. If both administrative data and survey data consistently
lead to similar substantive results, then research ﬁndings with survey data
may be considered credible despite measurement error. We investigate
18. We examined a number of additional variables that might be systematically related to
misreporting and could shed light on the mechanisms driving underreporting and overreporting. Given the ﬁndings of signiﬁcant relationships between misreporting and race, we considered whether language barriers might be partially responsible for misreporting. We tested
whether a dummy for speaking a language other than English at home predicted misreporting. It was not signiﬁcant, so we omitted this variable from our ﬁnal models.We also considered
including respondent gender, since interactions between gender roles and perceptions of government assistance might affect reporting. There were too few male respondents in Maryland
to successfully model, but in Minnesota and the pooled models there were not patterns of
signiﬁcant or substantive effects, so we did not include respondent gender in our ﬁnal models.
We also tested whether there was a relationship between participation in a number of other
public assistance programs ðsuch as Medicaid and SNAP/food stampsÞ and misreporting, since
familiarity with other beneﬁts or savvy in navigating beneﬁt receipt systems might relate to
reporting; we found no signiﬁcant relationships with common public programs aside from welfare ðTANFÞ.
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whether conclusions drawn from analyses are likely to be similar by estimating models of subsidy receipt, comparing the results when the dependent variable is based on survey responses to the model in which subsidy
receipt is based on the administrative data.19 We make two types of comparisons. First, we compare the survey and administrative data models to examine whether researchers would reach different conclusions about which
variables are statistically signiﬁcant and the strength of relationships with
subsidy receipt. Second, we assess whether the estimated coefﬁcients are
different to a statistically signiﬁcant degree across models. We present the
estimated marginal effects for the pooled probit models of subsidy receipt
in table 4. Models by state are presented in the appendix in table A5.20 In
the models, the covariates are based on the survey responses, and the only
difference between the two models is the use of administrative data on subsidy receipt as the dependent variable in one, while the other uses survey responses on subsidy receipt.
In the pooled model, the relationships between covariates and subsidy
receipt are substantively different depending on the data source used for the
dependent variable. The estimated marginal effect for high school is statistically signiﬁcant using the administrative data on subsidy receipt but not
when using the survey data ðand the estimated marginal effect is much reducedÞ. Additionally, the coefﬁcients for some college and BA or higher have
smaller marginal effects in the model using survey data on subsidy receipt
than in the administrative data model. Using the administrative data, there is
a large and signiﬁcant estimated marginal effect for part-time and full-time
work, but the estimated effect of part-time work becomes smaller and insigniﬁcant when using the survey data for subsidy receipt, and the marginal
effect for full-time work also decreases. While many marginal effects are
smaller in the model using survey data on subsidy receipt, some marginal
effects are larger than in the model using administrative data for subsidy
receipt.Thus, the direction of changes is not consistent.The different results
are related to the systematic patterns of misreporting; for instance, single
parents and those receiving welfare are much less likely to underreport—
19. These empirical models of subsidy receipt are intended only to illustrate the problem
of biased estimates due to measurement error. As such we included a standard set of child
and family demographic characteristics and did not address the issues of endogeneity of
subsidy receipt with employment or other variables.
20. We have also provided models of subsidy participation without employment as a
covariate in the appendix, in table A7, since employment may be endogenous to subsidy participation. Results are similar to the models with employment included.

708 |

Social Service Review

table 4. Comparison of Models of Subsidy Receipt Using Administrative and Survey Data
ðMarginal Effects for Probit ModelsÞ
Dependent Variable

Respondent’s education
ðless than high school omittedÞ:
High school
Some college
BA1
Respondent’s employment
ðno job omittedÞ:
Part-time ð< 30 hours/weekÞ
Full-time ð301 hours/weekÞ
Respondent race
ðwhite, non-Hispanic omittedÞ:
Hispanic
Nonwhite, non-Hispanic
Single parent
Welfare
Child’s age ðinfant omittedÞ:
Toddler
Preschool or school age
Number of children
N ðobservationsÞ
Probability of model
Pseudo R2

Administrative Subsidy
Receipt

Survey Subsidy
Receipt

.103*
ð.048Þ
.176***
ð.049Þ
.201*
ð.092Þ

.058
ð.052Þ
.0891
ð.052Þ
.1801
ð.093Þ

.184**
ð.057Þ
.173**
ð.054Þ

.033
ð.058Þ
.138*
ð.055Þ

2.063
ð.081Þ
2.043
ð.043Þ
.136**
ð.043Þ
.119**
ð.041Þ

.028
ð.085Þ
.030
ð.044Þ
.169***
ð.045Þ
.156***
ð.043Þ

.0991
ð.051Þ
.043
ð.047Þ
2.004
ð.018Þ
584
.000
.070

.1031
ð.053Þ
.0871
ð.050Þ
.025
ð.018Þ
584
.000
.059

Sources.—Authors’ calculations based on Maryland and Minnesota parent surveys and Maryland and
Minnesota administrative data.
Note.—Marginal effects are calculated at observed values for all characteristics. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
1
p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.

and therefore they have larger estimated coefﬁcients in the model using
survey data.While there is not a consistent set of covariates or clear consensus in the literature as to the factors associated with subsidy receipt ðBlau
and Tekin 2007; Meyer et al. 2009; Herbst and Tekin 2011b; Johnson et al.
2011; Johnson et al. 2012Þ, our ﬁndings, particularly in the administrative
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data model, that child age and parent education are associated with childcare subsidy receipt are consistent with other studies.
Overall, using the administrative data pooled model, 7 of 12 estimated
marginal effects were statistically signiﬁcant, and in the survey 7 of 12 are
signiﬁcant, but only 6 overlap, and a number of the signiﬁcant effects change
size substantially. To determine whether the differences in estimates between the models are statistically signiﬁcant, we conducted Wald tests for
the equality of coefﬁcients across the administrative and subsidy models
using the same set of covariates. In the pooled model, 4 coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly different across the models, speciﬁcally some college, part-time
work, nonwhite non-Hispanic, and number of children.The key point is that
researchers would draw different conclusions as to the factors associated
with subsidy use depending on whether their measure of subsidy receipt
came from survey or administrative data. This result illustrates how estimating models of participation in government programs using survey responses may be misleading.

c o m pa r i s o n o f r e s u lt s f o r m o d e l s u s i ng
subsidy r eceipt as a c ovariate
In order to demonstrate the extent of potential bias in a regression context
using mismeasured subsidy receipt as a covariate, we estimated binary
probit models for employment using the same set of covariates as in the
misreporting models ðwith the exception of employment and with the addition of subsidy receipt as a covariateÞ. The estimated marginal effects for
the pooled models using administrative data and survey reports on subsidy
receipt are compared in table 5. The models by state are presented in the
appendix, in table A6.
In the pooled administrative data model, the estimated marginal effect
for subsidy on the probability of employment is 16.5 percentage points ðp <
.01Þ. Using the survey reports of subsidy receipt, the estimated marginal
effect is less than half that size, 7.6 percentage points, and it is only marginally signiﬁcant ð p < .10Þ. The estimated marginal effect sizes for education
and their signiﬁcance levels also vary across the models. A researcher who
has administrative data on subsidy receipt would reach a different conclusion about the relationship between subsidy receipt and employment
than one who has only survey data. Estimates of the effect of subsidy on employment in the literature correcting for endogeneity range from none
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table 5. Comparison of Models of Employment Using Administrative and
Survey Data on Subsidy Receipt ðMarginal Effects for Probit ModelsÞ
Dependent Variable: Employed

Subsidy receipt
Respondent’s education
ðless than high school omittedÞ:
High school
Some college
BA1
Respondent’s race
ðwhite, non-Hispanic omittedÞ:
Hispanic
Nonwhite, non-Hispanic
Single parent
Welfare
Child’s age ðinfant omittedÞ:
Toddler
Preschool or school age
Number of children
N ðobservationsÞ
Probability of model
Pseudo R 2

Administrative

Survey

.165***
ð.041Þ

.0761
ð.039Þ

.100*
ð.048Þ
.112*
ð.050Þ
.214*
ð.092Þ

.116*
ð.048Þ
.139**
ð.049Þ
.239**
ð.092Þ

.106
ð.082Þ
2.027
ð.042Þ
.004
ð.044Þ
2.265***
ð.042Þ

.101
ð.083Þ
2.035
ð.042Þ
.013
ð.044Þ
2.262***
ð.043Þ

2.012
ð.050Þ
.035
ð.047Þ
2.015
ð.018Þ
584
.000
.108

2.005
ð.050Þ
.035
ð.048Þ
2.017
ð.018Þ
584
.000
.091

Sources.—Authors’ calculations based on Maryland and Minnesota parent surveys
and Maryland and Minnesota administrative data.
Note.—Marginal effects are calculated at observed values for all characteristics.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
1
p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.

ðMichalopoulos, Lundquist, and Castells 2010Þ to a 33 percentage point increase in employment ðBlau and Tekin 2007Þ. David Blau and Erdal Tekin’s
ð2007Þ estimate of a 13 percentage point effect in models not correcting for
endogeneity falls between our survey and administrative data results.
Based on statistical tests for differences in the estimated coefﬁcients
across the two models, in the pooled model, there was a signiﬁcant difference in the estimated coefﬁcient for subsidy receipt between the administrative and survey data models. In addition, there are signiﬁcant differences
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in the estimated coefﬁcients for high school education and for some college
in the pooled model. Overall, including mismeasured subsidy receipt as a
covariate can generate different estimated coefﬁcients for the subsidy receipt variable and potentially for other covariates as well.

d i s c u s s i o n a n d c o n c lu s i o n s
r e s e a r c h a n d p o l i c y i m p l i c at i o n s
Surveys are frequently used to estimate the predictors of receipt of government beneﬁts as well as program effects on participants. This research illustrates that, for child-care subsidies in two states, both underreporting
and overreporting occur and are systematically related to survey respondents’ characteristics. Notably, respondent education, employment, and race,
number of parents in the household, TANF receipt, child age, and number
of children are all systematically related to misreporting in at least one of
the models estimated in this study. The pattern of the estimated covariates
suggests that information problems and beneﬁt confusion are major contributors to misreporting. To illustrate the potential effects of these systematic measurement errors on conclusions drawn by researchers, we report how ﬁndings for models of subsidy receipt as a dependent variable,
and as a covariate, differ using measures of subsidy receipt from survey
versus administrative data.
The ﬁndings here have implications for the accuracy of estimates in studies relying on survey data to examine the predictors of child-care subsidy
receipt and the effects of child-care subsidies on various outcomes. Our ﬁndings suggest that systematic mismeasurement in subsidy receipt from surveys can bias the estimated predictors of participation as well as the estimated effects of subsidy on family and child outcomes.These ﬁndings have
implications not just for child-care subsidy research but for any research
using survey data to study government beneﬁts.
Researchers often validate survey responses or check for measurement
error by comparing program receipt in a survey sample to the overall population rate from administrative data ðBlau and Tekin 2007; Meyer et al.
2009; Herbst and Tekin 2011b; Johnson et al. 2011; Johnson et al. 2012Þ.
Given our ﬁndings that both underreporting and overreporting are occurring, we caution that it is possible to obtain similar sample and population
level estimates of participation and still have problematic measurement
error in the sample due to an offsetting combination of underreporting and
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overreporting. It is also important to model the predictors of underreporting
and overreporting separately, as different processes may contribute to these
errors. The rates of underreporting and overreporting and the population
rate of beneﬁt receipt all interact in shaping survey estimates. For instance,
in the two states examined, we ﬁnd that estimates of subsidy program
participation based on the survey data are inﬂated by 6–8 percentage points
due to overreporting.

l i m i tat i o n s
While our ﬁndings are an illustration of the problems misreporting can
generate when using survey data, one should be cautious in generalizing
these ﬁndings to other surveys and other samples. Our sample provides a
case study of response problems in only two states, focusing on low-income
families. That similar misreporting problems occur in both Maryland and
Minnesota suggests that misreporting is likely to be an issue in other states
as well. Since our study targets families likely to be eligible for child-care
subsidies, our misreporting rates are indicative of measurement error in
research using surveys of eligible families. Similar problems are likely to occur in research that extracts a sample of eligible families from a national
survey.21 If eligible families in national surveys misreport in a similar fashion
to our sample, estimated rates of beneﬁt receipt would be similarly distorted. Using all respondents in a nationally representative survey, rather
than just an eligible subsample, is likely to yield different rates of misreporting than found here. Underreporting, which conditions on subsidy receipt,
should occur at a similar rate. Because a smaller share of individuals is eligible, the overreporting rate is likely to be lower. However, because participation rates are much lower in a national population than an eligible one,
estimates of subsidy receipt are likely to be overestimated to even a greater
extent than in our surveys.
Our sampling strategy also speciﬁcally targeted individuals applying for
assistance at their county social services ofﬁce. Thus, our respondents were
disproportionately receiving TANF beneﬁts relative to the typical subsidy

21. An additional issue in studying government beneﬁts is correctly identifying the eligible population, as eligibility markers may be misreported. Mismeasured eligibility can substantially bias research on government assistance ðDuclos 1995; Hernandez and Pudney
2007Þ.

Measurement Error in Receipt of Child-Care Subsidies

| 713

entrant. Although we cannot be certain how this nonrepresentative sample
inﬂuenced our results, the fact that we ﬁnd that those receiving welfare are
signiﬁcantly less likely to underreport suggests that, if anything, our estimates of misreporting could be lower than we would have found in a random sample. Likewise, we would expect that having recently been at the
social services ofﬁce would raise survey respondents’ awareness of programs, and this would further lower misreporting in our sample as compared to a random sample. The effect of the moderate response rates to the
survey on measures of misreporting is uncertain, and it depends on whether
those who responded to our survey would be more or less likely to report
accurately than a random sample of low-income families.
Although match quality is an important concern for validation studies of
this kind, our near-universal match rate in the Minnesota administrative
data system means that we can be conﬁdent in the linking of those individuals in the subsidy administrative data to their survey responses. In Maryland, because we could only identify individuals who appear in the subsidy
administrative system, we only located records for 53 percent of survey
respondents. These individuals had received a child-care subsidy at some
point during the administrative data window, but they may or may not have
been receiving a subsidy at the time of the survey. Overall, however, it is
unlikely that match problems could fully account for our results. We use
similar procedures for matching in both states and ﬁnd similar rates of
misreporting.
A ﬁnal concern in identifying misreporting is whether, having matched
individuals, we accurately match the measures of subsidy receipt across the
administrative and survey data. The survey data ask about current subsidy
receipt, while our measure from the administrative data is based on services
received in the calendar month of the interview. These data are drawn from
the payment system, which should provide accurate information about services for which the subsidy program paid. We do not use the date of payment but rather the date of service, which should align with respondents’
reports of current subsidy receipt. However, data entry errors, payment system errors, and other similar issues could still affect our estimates.

h ow c a n t he r e l i a b i l i ty of r e s e a r c h be i m p r o v e d ?
Since our ﬁndings are consistent with a substantial body of literature identifying measurement error in surveys, an important issue in future research
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is improving the accuracy of survey responses. Several approaches can be
taken to improve the validity of measures of receipt of government beneﬁts.
The most obvious way is to use alternative data sources, especially administrative data, for information on program receipt. Studies of the effects of
subsidies using administrative data, including waitlists and subsidy leavers,
are less common than survey-based research, but these should be encouraged ðe.g., Berger and Black 1992; Lee et al. 2004; Grobe, Weber, and Davis
2008; Goerge 2009; Forry et al. 2013Þ. Obtaining administrative data typically requires data-sharing agreements between program administrators
and researchers as well as informed consent from the respondents. Ensuring the privacy of data is an important element of obtaining administrative
data. Government support for studies that incorporate administrative data
could also improve the validity of results. Additional approaches, such as experiments ðMichalopoulos et al. 2010Þ or the use of state-level policy variables combined with surveys ðRigby et al. 2007Þ should also be encouraged.
Advanced econometric methods to correct for response errors can also
be implemented in conjunction with encouraging validation studies for different government programs. For instance, Christopher Bollinger and Martin David ð1997Þ model underreporting and overreporting for food stamps
and then use the models of response error to adjust the determinants of participation in a wider sample. Although popular as a correction for measurement error, instrumental variable approaches generally fail in cases where
measurement error is not classical ðBound et al. 2001Þ. Using instrumental
variable techniques with a mismeasured binary variable will generate coefﬁcient estimates that are inﬂated relative to both the estimate with mismeasured survey data and the true value ðBound et al. 2001Þ. Measurement error
in survey reports of subsidy receipt may be why some studies ðe.g., Herbst
and Tekin 2010, 2012, 2011bÞ generate much larger instrumental variable estimates of the effect of subsidy receipt than their ordinary least squares estimates; true values are likely to be in between the two estimates.
Another approach is to study and improve how survey questions are
worded and asked. The surveys we used asked about current subsidy receipt. The relatively low rates of misreporting may be in part due to asking
for contemporaneous rather than recalled information. Having to recall
beneﬁt receipt, especially for longer recall periods, increases error and bias
ðBound et al. 2001; Klerman et al. 2009; Michalopoulos et al. 2010; Call et al.
2013Þ. For instance, the Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey-Kindergarten
cohort ðECLS-KÞ, which is used to study the effect of child-care subsidies
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on a variety of outcomes ðe.g., Herbst and Tekin 2011a, 2011b, 2014Þ, includes
a question about receipt of child-care assistance in the previous year. This
question is likely to suffer from more misreporting than a question asking
about contemporaneous receipt.
Additional research is needed to understand why misreporting is occurring, particularly overreporting, which is often neglected in the literature.
Our investigation of the characteristics of overreporters in the two states
ﬁnds that they were often paying for child care in amounts comparable to
those receiving a subsidy. Overreporters were not particularly likely to be
attending Head Start or public prekindergarten programs, which, given that
they are free for parents, might be considered a subsidy by some. Overreporters also frequently reported TANF receipt, suggesting that beneﬁt
confusion may be the cause of overreporting in some cases.
Research to develop survey questions that will more accurately identify
beneﬁt receipt is merited; using the state-speciﬁc name of the program may
factor into relatively low underreporting rates in our study. However, adding
in questions about help paying for child care from a welfare ofﬁce did not
improve estimates. Studies that compare the accuracy of responses about
beneﬁt receipt under different question phrasings will be valuable, along
with additional qualitative work investigating respondents’ understanding
of different ways to ask about beneﬁt receipt.
It is critical to have accurate estimates of the effects of government
programs in order to assess their value to individuals and society. Surveys
are important research tools in assessing government programs, and sometimes alternative data sources are limited, problematic, or simply unavailable. However, as this work demonstrates, researchers and policy makers
need to understand how analyses based on survey data may misrepresent
the relationships between government programs, participants’ characteristics, and other outcomes. Additionally, researchers may need to reassess the
conclusions drawn from studies based on survey data, which have served as
the empirical foundation for subsidy policy and many other government
programs. Moving forward, it will be important to apply existing methods
for addressing measurement error, as well as to develop new methods for
correcting or bounding estimates for bias induced by measurement error.
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a pp e n d i x
Supplementary Tables
table a1.

Sample Descriptives
Subsidy Received
ðSample for
UnderreportingÞ
MD

MN

Report of child-care subsidy:
Report accurately
85.5 80.8
Misreport
14.5 19.2
Respondent’s education:
Less than high school
12.0 17.5
High school
34.9 35.8
Some college
44.6 40.0
BA1
8.4
6.7
Respondent’s employment:
No employment
72.3 42.5
Part-time employment
ð< 30 hoursÞ
14.5 23.3
Full-time employment
ð301 hoursÞ
13.3 34.2
Number of parents:
Two parents
9.6 26.7
Single parent
90.4 73.3
Welfare status:
Not on welfare
32.9 32.5
On welfare
67.1 67.5
Child’s age:
Infant
21.7
21.7
Toddler
30.1
35.0
Preschool or school age
48.2 43.3
Respondent’s race:
White, non-Hispanic
19.3 44.2
Hispanic
4.8
6.7
Nonwhite, non-Hispanic
75.9 49.2
Total
100.0 100.0
Mean number of children
1.6
2.0
SD number of children
.9
1.0
N ðobservationsÞ
83
120

No Subsidy ðSample
for OverreportingÞ

All

Pooled

MD

MN

Pooled

MD

MN

Pooled

82.8
17.2

82.1
17.9

78.4
21.6

80.2
19.8

83.1
16.9

79.3
20.7

81.1
18.9

15.3
35.5
41.9
7.4

26.1
38.6
27.7
7.6

30.7
32.2
34.2
3.0

28.5
35.2
31.1
5.2

21.7
37.5
33.0
7.9

25.7
33.5
36.4
4.4

23.9
35.3
34.8
6.0

54.7

76.1

66.8

71.3

74.9

57.7

65.5

19.7

10.3

14.6

12.5

11.6

17.9

15.0

25.6

13.6

18.6

16.2

13.5

24.5

19.5

19.7
80.3

21.9
78.1

42.7
57.3

32.7
67.3

18.0
82.0

36.7
63.3

28.2
71.8

32.7
67.3

51.6
48.4

26.6
73.4

38.6
61.4

45.9
54.1

28.8
71.2

36.6
63.4

21.7
33.0
45.3

22.3
29.3
48.4

36.2
23.1
40.7

29.5
26.1
44.4

22.1
29.6
48.3

30.7
27.6
41.7

26.8
28.5
44.7

32.6 34.7
4.3
9.5
63.0 55.8
100.0 100.0
2.0
1.8
1.2
1.2
184
199

33.7
7.0
59.3
100.0
1.9
1.2
383

28.5 38.2
4.5
8.5
67.0 53.3
100.0 100.0
1.9
1.9
1.1
1.1
267
319

33.8
6.7
59.6
100.0
1.9
1.1
586

34.0
5.9
60.1
100.0
1.8
1.0
203

Source.—Authors’ calculations based on Maryland and Minnesota parent surveys and Maryland and
Minnesota administrative data.

table a2. Overreporting and Underreporting of Subsidy Receipt Using Alternative Time
Windows, Percentage by State
Administrative Data: Subsidy Receipt
Maryland

Minnesota

Survey Subsidy Receipt

No

Yes

Total

3-week deﬁnition:
No
Yes

83.7
16.3

12.9
87.1

60.3
39.7

100.0

100.0

100.0

82.1
17.9

14.5
85.5

100.0

Total
1-month deﬁnition:
No
Yes
Total
3-month deﬁnition:
No
Yes
Total
Ever received a subsidy:
No
Yes
Total

No

Yes

Total

61.0
39.0

78.4
21.6

19.2
80.8

56.1
43.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

83.8
16.2

23.5
76.5

61.9
38.1

78.8
21.2

21.4
78.6

56.1
43.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

84.6
15.4

42.0
58.0

61.9
38.1

85.4
14.6

36.0
64.0

56.1
43.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Sources.—Authors’ calculations based on Maryland and Minnesota parent surveys and Maryland and
Minnesota administrative data.
Note.—For Maryland, N ðobservationsÞ 5 257 for 3-week deﬁnition, N 5 267 for 1-month deﬁnition,
N 5 223 for 3-month and ever deﬁnitions. N 5 319 for all deﬁnitions in Minnesota.

table a3. Overreporting and Underreporting of Subsidy Receipt Using Broader Deﬁnition
of Subsidy, Percentage by State
Administrative Data: Subsidy Receipt
Maryland

Minnesota

Survey Subsidy Receipt

No

Yes

Total

No

Yes

Total

No
Yes

76.1
23.9

13.3
86.7

56.6
43.4

67.8
32.2

11.7
88.3

46.7
53.3

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Total

Sources.—Authors’ calculations based on Maryland and Minnesota parent surveys and Maryland and
Minnesota administrative data.
Note.—The broader deﬁnition includes additional response categories as positive indicators of subsidy
receipt. Maryland N ðobservationsÞ 5 267; Minnesota N ðobservationsÞ 5 319.

table a4. Marginal Effects for Probit Models of Underreporting and Overreporting:
Minnesota and Maryland
Dependent Variable
Subsidy Received:
Pr(Underreporting)

Respondent’s education
ðless than high school omittedÞ:
High school
Some college
BA1
Respondent’s employment
ðno job omittedÞ:
Part-time ð< 30 hours/weekÞ
Full-time ð301 hours/weekÞ
Respondent’s race
ðwhite, non-Hispanic omittedÞ:
Hispanic
Nonwhite, non-Hispanic
Single parent
Welfare
Child’s age ðinfant omittedÞ:
Toddler
Preschool or school age
Number of children
N ðobservationsÞ
Probability of model
Pseudo R 2

No Subsidy:
Pr(Overreporting)

Maryland

Minnesota

Maryland

Minnesota

2.057
ð.148Þ
2.138
ð.139Þ
.208
ð.313Þ

.011
ð.079Þ
.038
ð.091Þ
.080
ð.189Þ

2.082
ð.077Þ
2.1361
ð.077Þ
2.065
ð.123Þ

.082
ð.071Þ
2.042
ð.062Þ
.458*
ð.217Þ

.156
ð.142Þ
A

2.178*
ð.091Þ
2.321***
ð.075Þ

2.058
ð.083Þ
.002
ð.089Þ

2.1271
ð.072Þ
2.201***
ð.058Þ

B
.075
ð.111Þ
2.3121
ð.178Þ
2.230*
ð.115Þ

.442**
ð.156Þ
.141*
ð.067Þ
2.1511
ð.087Þ
2.129
ð.093Þ

.3151
ð.171Þ
.177***
ð.050Þ
2.013
ð.075Þ
.068
ð.060Þ

.156
ð.106Þ
.128*
ð.058Þ
.117*
ð.057Þ
2.003
ð.078Þ

2.137
ð.126Þ
2.098
ð.113Þ
.008
ð.052Þ
69
.078
.264

2.132
ð.094Þ
2.185*
ð.092Þ
2.013
ð.033Þ
120
.001
.288

.033
ð.076Þ
.053
ð.068Þ
2.019
ð.024Þ
183
.066
.116

2.000
ð.072Þ
.030
ð.065Þ
.079***
ð.024Þ
199
.000
.172

Sources.—Authors’ calculations based on Maryland and Minnesota parent surveys and Maryland and
Minnesota administrative data.
Note.—Marginal effects are calculated at observed values for all characteristics. A 5 predicts failure
perfectly ðN 5 11Þ, B 5 predicts failure perfectly ðN 5 2Þ. Standard errors are in parentheses.
1
p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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table a5. Comparison of Models of Subsidy Receipt Using Administrative and Survey Data
ðMarginal Effects for Probit ModelsÞ: Minnesota and Maryland
Dependent Variable: Administrative
or Survey Subsidy Receipt
Maryland

Respondent’s education
ðless than high school omittedÞ:
High school
Some college
BA1
Respondent’s employment
ðno job omittedÞ:
Part-time ð< 30 hours/weekÞ
Full-time ð301 hours/weekÞ
Respondent’s race
ðwhite, non-Hispanic omittedÞ:
Hispanic
Nonwhite, non-Hispanic
Single parent
Welfare
Child’s age ðinfant omittedÞ:
Toddler
Preschool or school age
Number of children
N ðobservationsÞ
Probability of model
Pseudo R 2

Minnesota

Administrative

Survey

Administrative

Survey

.140*
ð.065Þ
.243***
ð.069Þ
.179
ð.119Þ

.037
ð.076Þ
.071
ð.078Þ
.053
ð.124Þ

.087
ð.065Þ
.099
ð.066Þ
.327*
ð.134Þ

.078
ð.068Þ
.074
ð.068Þ
.357**
ð.127Þ

.086
ð.090Þ
.026
ð.087Þ

2.087
ð.088Þ
.058
ð.092Þ

.207**
ð.072Þ
.192**
ð.070Þ

.078
ð.073Þ
.115
ð.070Þ

.073
ð.142Þ
.097
ð.061Þ
.1261
ð.069Þ
.172**
ð.057Þ

.320*
ð.146Þ
.189**
ð.062Þ
.114
ð.077Þ
.219***
ð.060Þ

2.108
ð.098Þ
2.1081
ð.059Þ
.219***
ð.053Þ
.031
ð.064Þ

2.086
ð.100Þ
2.039
ð.061Þ
.265***
ð.055Þ
.056
ð.067Þ

2.028
ð.076Þ
2.006
ð.071Þ
2.062*
ð.027Þ
265
.000
.110

.045
ð.080Þ
.054
ð.073Þ
2.042
ð.027Þ
265
.000
.103

.200**
ð.068Þ
.061
ð.062Þ
.047*
ð.024Þ
319
.000
.116

.155*
ð.070Þ
.096
ð.065Þ
.086***
ð.024Þ
319
.000
.106

Sources.—Authors’ calculations based on Maryland and Minnesota parent surveys and Maryland and
Minnesota administrative data.
Note.—Marginal effects are calculated at observed values for all characteristics. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
1
p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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table a6. Comparison of Models of Employment Using Administrative and Survey Data
on Subsidy Receipt ðMarginal Effects for Probit ModelsÞ: Minnesota and Maryland
Dependent Variable: Employed
Maryland

Subsidy receipt
Respondent’s education
ðless than high school omittedÞ:
High school
Some college
BA1
Respondent’s race
ðwhite, non-Hispanic omittedÞ:
Hispanic
Nonwhite, non-Hispanic
Single parent
Welfare
Child’s age ðinfant omittedÞ:
Toddler
Preschool or school age
Number of children
N ðobservationsÞ
Probability of model
Pseudo R 2

Minnesota

Administrative

Survey

Administrative

Survey

.029
ð.056Þ

2.023
ð.052Þ

.196***
ð.056Þ

.0931
ð.055Þ

.134*
ð.061Þ
.1221
ð.063Þ
.357**
ð.111Þ

.137*
ð.060Þ
.130*
ð.061Þ
.363**
ð.110Þ

.102
ð.066Þ
.099
ð.066Þ
.075
ð.144Þ

.1181
ð.067Þ
.1201
ð.067Þ
.111
ð.147Þ

.152
ð.126Þ
.147**
ð.052Þ
.085
ð.058Þ
2.275***
ð.051Þ

.163
ð.126Þ
.154**
ð.051Þ
.090
ð.058Þ
2.265***
ð.052Þ

.060
ð.099Þ
2.091
ð.060Þ
.042
ð.059Þ
2.319***
ð.065Þ

.054
ð.101Þ
2.1101
ð.061Þ
.061
ð.059Þ
2.327***
ð.065Þ

2.076
ð.068Þ
.005
ð.065Þ
2.016
ð.024Þ
265
.000
.181

2.077
ð.068Þ
.007
ð.065Þ
2.019
ð.024Þ
265
.000
.180

.041
ð.068Þ
.075
ð.063Þ
2.022
ð.024Þ
319
.000
.144

.065
ð.068Þ
.076
ð.063Þ
2.020
ð.025Þ
319
.000
.122

Sources.—Authors’ calculations based on Maryland and Minnesota parent surveys and Maryland and
Minnesota administrative data.
Note.—Marginal effects are calculated at observed values for all characteristics. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
1
p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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.330*
ð.145Þ
.186**
ð.062Þ
.119
ð.076Þ
.218***
ð.057Þ
.044
ð.080Þ
.051
ð.073Þ
2.040
ð.027Þ
265
.000
.099

.079
ð.140Þ
.1061
ð.060Þ
.1271
ð.068Þ
.158**
ð.054Þ
2.032
ð.076Þ
2.005
ð.071Þ
2.062*
ð.027Þ
265
.000
.107

.164*
ð.070Þ
.1081
ð.065Þ
.086***
ð.024Þ
319
.000
.099

2.086
ð.100Þ
2.053
ð.060Þ
.273***
ð.055Þ
.020
ð.065Þ

2.094
ð.101Þ
2.128*
ð.059Þ
.231***
ð.053Þ
2.030
ð.064Þ
.213**
ð.069Þ
.076
ð.062Þ
.0441
ð.024Þ
319
.000
.087

.089
ð.068Þ
.089
ð.068Þ
.374**
ð.126Þ

Survey

.1161
ð.066Þ
.1271
ð.066Þ
.352**
ð.136Þ

Administrative

Minnesota

Sources.—Authors’ calculations based on Maryland and Minnesota parent surveys and Maryland and Minnesota administrative data.
Note.—Marginal effects are calculated at observed values for all characteristics. Standard errors are in parentheses.
1
p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.

N ðobservationsÞ
Probability of model
Pseudo R 2

Number of children

Preschool or school age

Child’s age ðinfant omittedÞ:
Toddler

Welfare

Single parent

Nonwhite, non-Hispanic

Respondent’s race ðwhite, non-Hispanic omittedÞ:
Hispanic

BA1

Some college

.037
ð.076Þ
.072
ð.077Þ
.081
ð.120Þ

Survey

.145*
ð.064Þ
.249***
ð.068Þ
.185
ð.113Þ

Administrative

Maryland

Pooled

.032
ð.085Þ
.020
ð.044Þ
.174***
ð.045Þ
.128**
ð.042Þ
.106*
ð.054Þ
.0931
ð.050Þ
.025
ð.018Þ
584
.000
.051

.0981
ð.052Þ
.050
ð.048Þ
2.006
ð.018Þ
584
.000
.047

.065
ð.052Þ
.104*
ð.052Þ
.221*
ð.091Þ

Survey

2.043
ð.083Þ
2.048
ð.043Þ
.139**
ð.043Þ
.0751
ð.041Þ

.124**
ð.047Þ
.200***
ð.049Þ
.244**
ð.091Þ

Administrative

Dependent Variable: Administrative or Survey Subsidy Receipt

Comparison of Models of Subsidy Receipt Using Administrative and Survey Data ðMarginal Effects for Probit ModelsÞ: Without Employment

Respondent’s education ðless than high school omittedÞ:
High school

table a7.
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